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BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (BWC)

Australia, Indonesia to Co-Host Bio-Weapons Meeting Next Year

Agence France-Presse, 22 December 2004, accessed via <u>SpaceWar.com</u>
Australia and Indonesia will co-host a regional conference early next year aimed at preventing terrorists from using biological weapons... (169 words) <u>Click here for full text.</u>

Russia Suggests Strengthening Biological Weapons Convention

Interfax News Agency, 20 December 2004, accessed via lexis-nexis

Moscow favors further international efforts to strengthen the biological and toxic weapons convention... (129 words) Click here for full text.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC)

Umatilla Depot Workers to be Retrained in Wake of "Near-Miss" Chemical Exposure Incident

Global Security Newswire, 21 December 2004, www.nti.org

Chemical weapons destruction has been suspended and all 700 workers at the Umatilla Chemical Depot in Oregon are scheduled to be retrained in the wake of a Dec. 1 safety incident that one facility official called a "near-miss," ... (430 words) Click here for full text.



COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY (CTBT)

U.S., Russia Still on Nuclear Alert

Centre Daily Times, 19 December 2004, accessed via lexis-nexis

Just after midnight, in a secret bunker outside Moscow, the warning sirens began to blare. A simple, ominous message flashed on the bunker's main control panel: Missile Attack! (705 words)

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NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)

Iran Continues to Process Yellowcake Uranium

Global Security Newswire, 21 December 2004, www.nti.org

Despite a recent pledge to suspend all uranium enrichment activity, Iran has continued to process "yellowcake" uranium... (306 words) Click here for full text.

U.N. Atomic Agency in Forefront of Non-Proliferation Fight in 2004

Agence France-Presse, 19 December 2004, accessed via **SpaceWar.com**

In a year 2004 that saw the very foundations of the world's non-proliferation regime tested, the UN atomic agency battled to ensure Iran was not developing nuclear weapons while trying in vain to get inspectors back into Iraq and North Korea. (701 words) Click here for full text.

Nuclear Supplier States Set to Agree to Require Extra IAEA Protocol

Kyodo News Service, 17 December 2004, accessed via lexis-nexis

A group of nuclear supplier nations is set to agree next June to require recipients to ratify the International Atomic Energy Agency's additional protocol to beef up controls on weapons-grade uranium enrichment technology... (415 words) Click here for full text.

Bush Seeks More Russian Access to U.S. Nuclear Sites

Global Security Newswire, 13 December 2004, www.nti.org

U.S. President George W. Bush yesterday proposed providing Russia with increased access to U.S. nuclear storage sites to help improve overall nonproliferation efforts. (579 words)

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OTTAWA CONVENTION

State Department Awards \$5 Million for Mine Removal Projects -- United States Lends Support to Landmine Clearance Project in Angola

State Dept. Press Release, 21 December 2004, http://usinfo.state.gov

The Department of State's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement has awarded over \$5 million in grants to nongovernmental and international organizations, educational institutions, and civic associations for humanitarian mine action projects. (179 words) Click here for full text.



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PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE (PSI)

Malaysian Paper Views Australia's Maritime Security Plan as "Insincere"

BBC, 19 December 2004, accessed via lexis-nexis

Sometime ago, Australia was seen as rude when it adopted a policy, which allowed its military to launch pre-emptive strikes on countries considered to be "terrorist" bases. (474 words) Click here for full text.

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (START)

Russia Launches First ICBM from Own Territory Since 1991

BBC, 22 December 2004, accessed via lexis-nexis

The Strategic Missile Troops (SMT) carried out a combat training launch of a Voyevoda intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) at 1130 Moscow time (0830 gmt) on Wednesday... (204 words) Click here for full text.

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE-ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (SORT)

U.S. Cannot Verify Russian SORT Compliance

Global Security Newswire, 21 December 2004, www.nti.org

U.S. intelligence agencies determined shortly after the signing of the 2002 U.S.-Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty that it would not be able to verify whether Moscow was adhering to the pact... (160 words) **Click here for full text.**



FULL TEXT OF WEEKLY ARTICLES FOLLOWS:



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Australia, Indonesia to Co-Host Bio-Weapons Meeting Next Year

Agence France-Presse, 22 December 2004, accessed via <u>SpaceWar.com</u>
Australia and Indonesia will co-host a regional conference early next year aimed at preventing terrorists from using biological weapons, Defense Minister Robert Hill announced Wednesday.

Hill said the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) regional meeting would be held in Melbourne in February.

"There are increasing concerns about the possibility of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including biological weapons, and we see a valuable role for this workshop and follow-up activities in reducing the possibility of bioterrorism in our region," Hill said in a statement.

"By holding this workshop, Australia and Indonesia continue to demonstrate their strong commitment to stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and keeping our region free of biological weapons," he said.

"Australia and Indonesia have worked together closely in the past to promote effective implementation in our region of various arms control and disarmament treaties including the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention," he said.

The BWC bars signatory states from producing, stockpiling or acquiring biological weapons or their delivery systems.





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Russia Suggests Strengthening Biological Weapons Convention

Interfax News Agency, 20 December 2004, accessed via lexis-nexis

Moscow favors further international efforts to strengthen the biological and toxic weapons convention, the Russian Foreign Ministry said in a statement circulated after the annual meeting of the convention's signatory nations in Geneva on December 6-10.

"The Russian delegation called for more intensive efforts to strengthen the convention," the statement said.

Participants at the meeting spoke about the "urgency of collective steps needed to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including biological weapons, and preventing them from falling into the hands of terrorists."

The Geneva meeting confirmed the "willingness of the majority of signatories to resume efforts towards working out control mechanisms to examine compliance with the bio-convention".

"The six-year talks on the issue were interrupted in 2001 over differences with the United States," the document said.





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Umatilla Depot Workers to be Retrained in Wake of "Near-Miss" Chemical Exposure Incident

Global Security Newswire, 21 December 2004, www.nti.org

Chemical weapons destruction has been suspended and all 700 workers at the Umatilla Chemical Depot in Oregon are scheduled to be retrained in the wake of a Dec. 1 safety incident that one facility official called a "near-miss," the East Oregonian reported.

Two workers put at least themselves at risk of chemical exposure when they unclamped a working filter in the building's ventilation system. "We're taking this event very seriously," Doug Hamrick, manager for U.S. Army contractor Washington Demilitarization Co., said Thursday. "We could have hurt somebody."

The Dec. 1 incident was the third to temporarily halt disposal of the 7.4 million pounds of chemical weapons stored at the facility, the East Oregonian reported. Employees in two events ignored markings on doors warning them not to enter an area, and on both occasions were not wearing the appropriate level of protective gear, said Dennis Murphey, administrator for the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality's chemical demilitarization program.

"Everybody I've talked to is really stunned it happened," Murphey said. "It's extremely important that all the workers recognize and appreciate the consequences of the actions they're taking."

Washington Demilitarization is requiring that all depot personnel meet individually with supervisors to make sure they understand safety procedures. One employee from each work shift will be designated to monitor communications between workers, supervisors and the building control room, the East Oregonian reported. There is no set schedule for the resumption of chemical weapons destruction.

The Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program, which funds equipment for emergency responders and emergency management and planning for a potential attack on the Umatilla Chemical Depot, will not be eliminated, said Dale Ormond, deputy assistant secretary of the U.S. Army's program to eliminate chemical weapons. "I am not here to eliminate the CSEPP program," Ormond said Thursday at a public meeting in Hermiston, Ore. "As a steward of taxpayer dollars, I am asking the question 'does the capability to provide protection change as the stockpiles are destroyed?" he said.

Umatilla and Morrow counties in Oregon have received about \$90 million in CSEPP funds, according to the Government Accountability Office.

Meanwhile, Umatilla workers detected a trace amount of sarin vapor Sunday inside a storage structure, the U.S. Army said in a press release. Most weapons in the structure have previously leaked and are packed in larger containers. The structure's "passive" filter system prevents vapor from escaping. As an additional safety precaution, a powered filter system was installed Sunday, according to the Army. A crew was expected to enter the structure yesterday to locate the source of the vapor, according to the statement.





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U.S., Russia Still on Nuclear Alert

Centre Daily Times, 19 December 2004, accessed via lexis-nexis

Just after midnight, in a secret bunker outside Moscow, the warning sirens began to blare. A simple, ominous message flashed on the bunker's main control panel: Missile Attack!

It was no drill. A Soviet satellite had detected five U.S. nuclear missiles inbound.

The control computer ordered a counterstrike, but the bunker commander, a nerdy lieutenant colonel named Stanislav Petrov, acting on a hunch, overrode the computer and told his Kremlin superiors it was a false alarm. The Soviet brass quickly stood down their missiles, saving 100 million Americans from nuclear incineration.

This brush with Armageddon happened more than two decades ago, but nuclear missiles are still on hair-trigger alert in Russia and the United States. Today, they may be even more vulnerable to an accidental or renegade launch than they were in Petrov's day.

"The security of both nations should not be dependent on the heroic act or good judgment of a single individual," said Sam Nunn, the former senator from Georgia.

Long active in anti-proliferation efforts such as the Nuclear Threat Initiative, Nunn is leading a campaign to persuade U.S. and Russian leaders to take their thousands of strategic nuclear warheads off hair-trigger alert, a status that remains in effect more than a decade after the Cold War ended.

"The chances of a premeditated, deliberate nuclear attack have fallen dramatically," Nunn said in an interview with Knight Ridder. "But the chances of an accidental, mistaken or unauthorized nuclear attack might actually be increasing."

The first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which took effect 10 years ago this month, doesn't address hair triggering. Nor does the Treaty of Moscow, which Bush signed with Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2002 to reduce the size of the U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals.

Nunn believes the hair-trigger status has become "the most dangerous element of our force posture."

A hair trigger means missiles are launched -- either from land or sea -- upon the warning of an attack. That is, within about 15 minutes of a confirmed warning. In theory, the assurance that a retaliatory attack would be launched before the missiles could be destroyed would deter either country from trying a nuclear sneak attack.

"This is the logic of the Cold War -- Mutual Assured Destruction," said Daniil O. Kobyakov, a nuclear expert at the PIR Center, a policy studies institute in Moscow. "De-alerting requires a change in rationale. There's still a certain inertia on both sides."





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Nunn and others see that inertia in the Bush administration's refusal to consider the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and its request -- since defeated in the Senate -- for some \$500 million for research on a so-called "bunker buster" nuclear weapon and low-yield "mininukes."

Russia, too, has some Cold War inertia to overcome. Putin proudly announced last month that Russia was testing "the newest nuclear missile systems ... that other nuclear states do not have." He offered no further details about the weapons.

Government officials in both countries are keen to point out that they've stopped targeting each other with their nuclear missiles, although experts say this "de-targeting" is political hokum.

The old targeting data and missile trajectories are stored in command computers, Kobyakov said. And missiles can be re-targeted in a matter of seconds: A couple of mouse clicks on a computer would put Washington, Miami or Moscow back in the nuclear crosshairs.

But it's the danger of accidental or maverick launches that most concerns atomic experts. That danger is heightened, in part, by the decrepit state of Russian defenses.

"The Russian Early Warning System is essentially useless," said Theodore Postol, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and an expert on early warning issues and technology.

Holes in Russia's satellite and radar networks, Postol said, mean U.S. submarines in the North Atlantic can strike Moscow with a two- or three-minute warning for the Russian capital. Launches from the North Pacific could hit the city with no warning at all.

Postol also said a new Prognoz satellite warning system "may never be in place."

Stanislav Petrov, the old bunker commander, the man who saved America back in 1983, nodded his head sadly when told of Postol's assessment.

"That's right, not enough satellites," he said. "We never had enough."





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Iran Continues to Process Yellowcake Uranium

Global Security Newswire, 21 December 2004, www.nti.org

Despite a recent pledge to suspend all uranium enrichment activity, Iran has continued to process "yellowcake" uranium, diplomats close to the International Atomic Energy Agency said today.

"The Iranians have decided to continue UF4 (uranium tetrafluoride) production until the end of February," a diplomat told Reuters. Two other diplomats in Vienna confirmed the report.

Iranian officials agreed last month in negotiations with the European powers not to process any yellowcake uranium that was not already in the conversion facility, Reuters reported. However, Tehran has now decided to convert all 37 tons of its raw uranium.

"This goes beyond the agreement to only convert what was absolutely necessary," one diplomat said.

Meanwhile, a senior Iranian nuclear negotiator said today that the United States is seeking to hold direct talks with Iran to discuss its nuclear program.

Iran does not object to European Union efforts to include Washington in ongoing nuclear negotiations, said Hossein Mousavian, secretary of the foreign policy committee on Iran's Supreme National Security Council, according to Reuters.

"The United States wants negotiations with Iran and definitely doesn't like having a mediator in between, even if the Europeans want to mediate," the official IRNA news agency quoted Mousavian as saying.

"The Europeans have launched massive efforts to bring the United States into the nuclear negotiations," Mousavian said. "We have no objection to the Americans joining the Europeans in this process."

"If the Americans want to hamper the Iran-EU cooperation, they can be effective and no one can deny it. ... U.S. interaction with Europe in this process is important from our point of view, nevertheless our partner is Europe, not America," Mousavian said. "I don't reject the possibility of nuclear talks between Iran and the United States, but I cannot predict the future."

A Western diplomat in Tehran, however, said discussions of the United States joining the talks were premature, but added that the EU "has been very clear that negotiations would have a much bigger chance of success if the Americans put their shoulders behind it."

U.S. officials remained skeptical that Iran is negotiating in good faith, he added.

"We're a long way from the Americans taking a seat at the negotiating table," he said.





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U.N. Atomic Agency in Forefront of Non-Proliferation Fight in 2004

Agence France-Presse, 19 December 2004, accessed via <u>SpaceWar.com</u>
In a year 2004 that saw the very foundations of the world's non-proliferation regime tested, the UN atomic agency battled to ensure Iran was not developing nuclear weapons while trying in vain to get inspectors back into Iraq and North Korea.

It was a high-profile year for International Atomic Energy Agency chief Mohamed ElBaradei, who campaigned for a strengthening of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which mandates the IAEA's work verifying international atomic safeguards.

The spotlight was on Iran, which the IAEA has been investigating for two years and which the United States has alleged was part of "an axis of evil" and hiding nuclear weapons development.

Tehran denies the charge, saying its atomic program is a peaceful effort to develop nuclear power for electricity.

But the IAEA documented in 2004 continuing gaps in Iran's reporting of its nuclear activities, including work on sophisticated centrifuges for enriching uranium, although ElBaradei acknowledged the "jury is still out" on whether Tehran has a covert weapons program.

The year began with the unraveling of a deal Britain, France and Germany, had struck with Iran to suspend uranium enrichment, a key part of the nuclear fuel cycle.

The year ended with the confidence-building deal patched back together, and endorsed by the IAEA at a meeting of its 35-nation board of governors in Vienna in November.

This left the European trio and Iran free to embark in December on negotiations on a long-term agreement setting out rewards for Tehran in return for a full suspension of uranium enrichment, the process which makes nuclear fuel for civilian power reactors, but which in a highly refined form could also be used as the explosive core of atomic bombs.

But the United States, which lobbied unsuccessfully in 2004 for the IAEA to take Iran to the UN Security Council for possible sanctions, remained skeptical that Tehran was coming clean even if Washington, burdened by the ongoing insurgency in Iraq, took a back seat and gave the European negotiations a chance.

Diplomats said however the talks could not succeed unless Washington eventually takes part, since Iran cannot get rewards such as joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) or receiving regional security guarantees without US support.

In a sign of continuing concern about Iran's intentions, diplomats close to the IAEA said in December that Tehran was conducting secret high-energy neutron experiments, allegedly





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taking place under military supervision, that could be destined for civilian purposes or aimed at making nuclear weapons.

ElBaradei also campaigned in 2004 to fix a loophole in the NPT which does not ban enriching uranium, for example.

He said in March after talks with US President George W. Bush: "The important thing is to try to see how we can move the agenda of the non-proliferation regime forward."

ElBaradei wants to eliminate the danger that nuclear fuel declared for peaceful uses could also be used to make atomic bombs by having a multilateral body make the fuel, rather than letting individual states do it.

ElBaradei said in Geneva in October that tighter global controls on the export of nuclear material and technology must be included in a bolstered NPT up for debate in 2005, particularly after revelations about a nuclear smuggling network run by Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's atomic bomb.

ElBaradei also said no country should be allowed to bow out of the NPT "without clear consequences" before the UN Security Council.

North Korea kicked out IAEA inspectors and withdrew from the NPT in 2003 after it revived the Yongbyon nuclear reactor, marking the first time any country has withdrawn from a multilateral arms control treaty.

North Korea now claims it has made several atomic bombs.

The IAEA wants to return its inspectors to North Korea and also to Iraq, where they have not been allowed since the US invasion in 2003 to topple Saddam Hussein.

The IAEA was more successful in 2004 in Libya, where it oversaw the nuclear side of Libya's dismantling of its weapons of mass destruction programs, under an agreement Tripoli reached in December 2003 with the US and Britain.

Meanwhile, ElBaradei will be trying in 2005 to get a third four-year-term as IAEA chief, but the United States opposes this.





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Nuclear Supplier States Set to Agree to Require Extra IAEA Protocol

Kyodo News Service, 17 December 2004, accessed via lexis-nexis

A group of nuclear supplier nations is set to agree next June to require recipients to ratify the International Atomic Energy Agency's additional protocol to beef up controls on weapons-grade uranium enrichment technology, a U.S. administration official said in a recent interview.

In a meeting of experts in Vienna in late October on the issue of revising its guidelines, the 44-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group came to a 'fairly broad agreement to make the additional protocol a new condition' the Energy Department official told Kyodo News on condition of anonymity.

The official said he is 'pretty confident' the NSG will agree and revise the guidelines in a general meeting next June. Its members include five declared nuclear powers -- Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States. Noting that some members 'still...aren't quite sure,' the official said, 'I think we're pretty darn close on that and I'd expect agreement by that time.'

The additional protocol commits countries to grant short-notice access and other expanded rights to IAEA inspectors under its underlying safeguard agreements to enable them to provide assurances about both declared and undeclared nuclear activities, including uranium-related programs. It effectively allows inspections virtually without advance notice.

The official said the envisioned new guidelines will define 'a fairly obvious set of criteria' for the NSG members when accepting technological transfers to other countries.

They will include assessing the energy need, assuring effective export controls and ratifying the IAEA additional protocol, the official said.

The NSG has been working to revise its guidelines amid twists and turns, particularly involving a tough U.S. proposal and an initiative hammered out at a summit of the Group of Eight major nations -- Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia and the United States -- in June on Sea Island, Georgia.

In an NSG general meeting in May, the United States proposed restricting in principle the exports of nuclear technologies to countries that have not ratified the IAEA additional protocol. But many other members objected to the U.S. proposal.

At the G-8 summit in June, the eight leaders adopted an action plan on nuclear nonproliferation, agreeing among other things to freeze for one year any new transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to other nations and urging the NSG to strengthen its guidelines.

The NSG was established in 1974 following India's nuclear tests, with the objective of promoting nuclear nonproliferation to address the risk raised by the Indian tests over the misuse of nuclear technology and materials transferred for peaceful purposes.





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Bush Seeks More Russian Access to U.S. Nuclear Sites

Global Security Newswire, 13 December 2004, www.nti.org

U.S. President George W. Bush yesterday proposed providing Russia with increased access to U.S. nuclear storage sites to help improve overall nonproliferation efforts.

Bush said there is a need to improve cooperation with Russia to secure stockpiles of nuclear materials — an issue of debate during this year's U.S. presidential election campaign.

"I think one of the things we need to do is to give the Russians equal access to our sites, our nuclear storage sites to see what works and what doesn't work, to build confidence between our two governments," Bush said in response to a question on U.S.-Russian relations during an end-of-the-year press conference.

To address long-standing concerns about the vulnerability of Russian nuclear weapons and materials to theft or acts of terrorism, the United States conducts several programs to help improve security at nuclear sites. Such efforts have been hindered, however, by charges from both Washington and Moscow over lack of access to each other's facilities.

Last month, though, a high-level delegation from the Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency visited several U.S. sites, including the Pantex nuclear weapons plant in Texas, the Savannah River Site in South Carolina and the Sandia National Laboratory in New Mexico, according to an Energy Department official. The purpose of the visit was to discuss best practices for securing nuclear materials and to show Russian officials how such materials were protected at U.S. sites, the official said, adding that the Russian delegation was escorted during its visit. The U.S. official said the Russian visit was unrelated to Bush's remarks yesterday.

Nonproliferation advocates praised the president's comments.

"I applaud President Bush's willingness to discuss Russia's reciprocal access to our nuclear sites," said former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn, who now heads the Nuclear Threat Initiative. "Both countries have a vital stake in working together to prevent catastrophic terrorism by keeping nuclear materials and weapons out of the hands of terrorists. Notwithstanding our inevitable differences, our mutual security depends on cooperation, and cooperation requires a much higher degree of reciprocity."

During his tenure in the Senate, Nunn was one of the architects of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, which seeks to secure and dispose of former Soviet weapons of mass destruction.

While the Bush administration "deserves some credit" for attempting to break the "logjam" surrounding the access issue, questions remain on how the White House would resolve the dispute and how such access would be provided, said William Hoehn of the Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council. He said that access would likely have to be negotiated on a case-by-case basis.

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Bush's remarks sent "a very important signal" to Moscow, indicating continued interest in pursuing nonproliferation cooperate despite recent tensions, such as those concerning the Ukrainian presidential election, said Rose Gottemoeller of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

In his remarks yesterday, Bush noted several disagreements that have arisen between him and Russian President Vladimir Putin, including the U.S. decision to invade Iraq and recent moves by the Kremlin to increase its domestic political control. Even so, Bush praised the current standing of the U.S.-Russian relationship, which he described as "vital and important."

"Vladimir Putin and I have got a good personal relationship," Bush said. "I intend to keep it that way. It's important for Russia and the United States to have the kind of relationship where if we disagree with decisions, we can do so in a friendly and positive way."

According to reports, Bush and Putin are scheduled to meet in February in Slovakia.





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State Department Awards \$5 Million for Mine Removal Projects -- United States Lends Support to Landmine Clearance Project in Angola

State Dept. Press Release, 21 December 2004, http://usinfo.state.gov

The Department of State's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement has awarded over \$5 million in grants to nongovernmental and international organizations, educational institutions, and civic associations for humanitarian mine action projects.

These 20 grants are in addition to over \$115 million that the department invested in mine action in fiscal year 2004, the department said in a prepared statement December 20. The Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement is in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs.

The State Department also announced an initiative by the Humpty Dumpty Institute (HDI), a New York-based nongovernmental organization, to fund landmine clearance in Angola with proceeds generated by the sale of donated U.S. surplus powdered milk.

The HDI has arranged for the sale of U.S. nonfat dry milk in Angola that was made available under a U.S. Department of Agriculture food aid program, the department said.

Using the proceeds of the sale, HDI will apply approximately \$620,000 to remove landmines from 1,500 kilometers of a major road network linking rich agricultural land with key commercial markets in Angola's Planalto region.





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Malaysian Paper Views Australia's Maritime Security Plan as "Insincere"

BBC, 19 December 2004, accessed via lexis-nexis

Sometime ago, Australia was seen as rude when it adopted a policy, which allowed its military to launch pre-emptive strikes on countries considered to be "terrorist" bases. Now Prime Minister John Howard has once again angered its neighbors with a new policy on territorial waters. Australia plans to create a maritime surveillance zone that will stretch into Indonesian waters. According to the policy, all ships destined for Australia could be intercepted by its warships once they are within a 1,850-km security net stretching as far as New Zealand and beyond Indonesia. Once inside the zone, the ships concerned will be required to identify themselves and give details of their crew and cargo.

Not only that. Suspicious vessels will be intercepted and seized in compliance with the global security treaty for stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Canberra's plan actually has very much in common with the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), designed and implemented by the United States and its allies. In connection with this, earlier, a Greek warship confiscated equipment suspected to be for Libya's nuclear weapons production from a ship in the Mediterranean Sea. Actually, Howard's move to apply the PSI in this region is an extension of the policy of invasion and a new form of colonization led by the United States. It is also in line with Howard who wants to be the deputy sheriff of US President George W. Bush in the Asian region.

In an effort to persuade Indonesia to accept the PSI concept, Australia sent Defense Minister Robert Hill to Jakarta. Indonesian leaders have condemned Canberra's anti-terrorism plan and considers its supposed prime initiative of hunting terrorists as a violation of the sovereignty of other independent countries. Australia and the United States had been giving warnings about the existence of what they deem to be Islamic militant groups in Indonesia. They became more obsessed with this after the bomb blasts in Bali and Jakarta, which targeted Australian tourists. New Zealand, which had earlier doubted Australia's real intentions, concurs with Canberra's move to create a maritime surveillance zone, without taking into consideration the fact that it is certainly a violation of Indonesian waters.

If the maritime surveillance is implemented, it becomes clear that the military actions by Australia are symbols of colonialism still strongly practiced by Howard. Perhaps, he is still dreaming of the time when Britain and other European powers deployed their military to colonize Asia. In truth, Canberra deliberately wants to arouse the contempt of its neighbors, particularly Indonesia, in its plan to implement the two initiatives. Actually, Jakarta is capable of dealing with any internal threat, whether from the militant or extremist groups. Indonesia, together with other ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) member countries are able to confront threats in this region without any help from Australia, which clearly has an insincere intentions.





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Russia Launches First ICBM from Own Territory Since 1991

BBC, 22 December 2004, accessed via lexis-nexis

The Strategic Missile Troops (SMT) carried out a combat training launch of a Voyevoda intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) at 1130 Moscow time (0830 GMT) on Wednesday (22 December), and Interfax-AVN correspondent has reported.

The launch was carried out by the combat crews of the missile division stationed in Orenburg Region.

The launch is meant to confirm the main flight performance specifications of R-36M-2 missiles (designated as RS-20 under START treaties, NATO designation Satan, US designation SS-18), which have no equivalents in the world and make up a substantial part of the combat potential of the SMT.

The feature of this combat training launch is that it is the first to carried out from a site on Russian territory after a long gap (the last launch was in 1991). Throughout the intervening period, ICBMs of this type were only launched from the Baykonur space launch site (Kazakhstan).

In order to launch Voyevoda missiles from Russian territory, a large amount of work has been done to equip the area with instruments to monitor the state of the missile in preparation for the launch and at the initial stage of its flight.

Prior to the launch, this particular missile had been on standby for over 16 years.





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U.S. Cannot Verify Russian SORT Compliance

Global Security Newswire, 21 December 2004, www.nti.org

U.S. intelligence agencies determined shortly after the signing of the 2002 U.S.-Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty that it would not be able to verify whether Moscow was adhering to the pact, Knight Ridder reported today.

The treaty requires both countries to reduce their stockpiles of deployed nuclear warheads to 2,200 each by the end of 2012. In an assessment issued a month after President George W. Bush signed the pact, U.S. intelligence determined that Russia's poor economic situation would probably force Moscow to reduce its number of deployed warheads to about 1,500, according to Knight Ridder. U.S. intelligence also determined, though, that there could be circumstances in which Russia could deploy without detection a few hundred more warheads than allowed by the treaty, Knight Ridder reported.

U.S. intelligence also concluded that warhead deployment counts could be verified if verification procedures contained in the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty could be extended past that agreement's expiration in 2009, Knight Ridder reported.

